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Sunday Morning – Margo Guryan
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발췌….
Vice Speaker Lee(명박의 형님) said that President Lee was pro-U.S. and pro-Japan to the core so there should be no questioning President Lee’s vision.
(뼛속까지…)Lee(명박의 형님) said he was concerned that if the beef agreement were finalized to allow imports of U.S. beef to begin entering Korea before the June 4 by-election, it could become the main election issue and cause GNP(한나라당) candidates to lose. This would deal a heavy blow to President Lee. Therefore, waiting until after the election to finalize the agreement would be helpful.
(역시 국민의 뜻은 아랑곳하지 않고 뒷구멍으로 쇠고기 협상하며 선거를 위해 미국에 애걸복걸…)Lee(명박의 형님) said, was that President Lee has “poor political instinct” since he had not been directly involved in Korean politics for very long. Worse still, many of President Lee’s close aides had also never run for the National Assembly.
Chun(전여옥-한나라당 당시 대변인) said her daughter recently returned from study in the U.S. and wondered why there was a debate over U.S. beef. More Koreans needed to have the chance to go to the U.S. to dispel myths about the U.S. and about U.S. beef, Chun concluded.
(한나라당-한나라당의 대변인으로서 전여옥이 발언한것이므로-의 촛불시위에 대한 대책은 한국사람들을 미국으로 보내는 것이었었다???)Representative Lee(명박의 형님) said that President Lee Myung-bak is pro-U.S. but there are still some pro-DPRK(빨갱이) elements in the press and in business.
(사실, 국정조사에 의하면 MB는 집권 3년차까지 노무현, 김대중보다 북한에 자금지원을 훨씬 많이 한걸로 밖혀졌다… 그러니 노무현, 김대중정부에 북한에 퍼주기를 했다는둥 x소리는 삼가해주기 바람…)* Note: ( )안은 eroica가 추가한 것임… 전체 원문은 아래에…
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001087
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: LEE SANG-DEUK ON BEEF, PRESIDENT LEE’S MISSTEPS
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Over a lunch of U.S. beef, the Ambassador
and Vice Speaker Lee, who is President Lee Myung-bak’s elder
brother, discussed solutions to the continuing controversy
over the planned reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef.
Vice Speaker Lee and recently reelected lawmaker Chun Yu-ok
were pessimistic the controversy would subside soon, but
optimistic that U.S. beef would soon reenter the market. Lee
suggested it might be politically better for the Lee
government to delay the official opening until after the June
4 by-elections. If not, a sweeping defeat for GNP candidates
could damage future ROKG initiatives. Because progressive,
anti-American, and pro-DPRK leaders had directed the ROKG and
the Korean media for the last ten years, it was difficult now
for President Lee to overcome media bias and well-organized
leftist groups to resolve the beef issue. He thought,
however, the situation would be easier once the
GNP-controlled National Assembly started its session in June.
Both the Vice Speaker and pro-MB lawmaker Chun Yu-ok
acknowledged that President Lee had made some mistakes that
had contributed to people’s dissatisfaction with his
Administration. Most of the President’s missteps they
attributed to President Lee’s lack of “political instinct.”
They both also expressed disappointment in Park Geun-hye and
other conservative leaders for not supporting President Lee
on beef and other issues. Lee emphasized that U.S. support
was key to helping the ROKG overcome the beef problem. Vice
Speaker Lee said that President Lee was pro-U.S. and
pro-Japan to the core so there should be no questioning
President Lee’s vision. Ultimately, President Lee would do
right by the alliance and work well with both the U.S. and
Japan. Lee said that the main task in the new National
Assembly would be to pass the KORUS FTA. END SUMMARY
BEEF CONTROVERSY
¶2. (C) During a pleasant lunch with President Lee’s elder
brother Lee Sang-deuk, the Ambassador asked if there was some
way to diffuse the controversy surrounding the reopening of
the Korean market to U.S. beef. Vice Speaker Lee explained
that the “386 generation” focused on anti-American, pro-DPRK,
pro-Unification policies while younger Koreans are now
protesting against U.S. beef with a different motive.
Despite the different motive, the ideology of the 386-ers had
influenced the young people protesting the reopening of the
Korean market to U.S. beef imports. While ten years ago some
felt that the U.S. was more of an enemy than North Korea, now
young people are worried about finding a job. While some
worry that anti-beef sentiment could spiral into anti-U.S.
sentiment, Lee thought that once U.S. beef was available in
Korean stores, anti-beef protests would subside. Eventually,
as holdovers from the anti-American/pro-DPRK period
(1998-2008 Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung presidencies) were
pushed out of positions of power and influence, such issues
would cease to be big problems.
¶3. (C) Lee said he was concerned that if the beef agreement
were finalized to allow imports of U.S. beef to begin
entering Korea before the June 4 by-election, it could become
the main election issue and cause GNP candidates to lose.
This would deal a heavy blow to President Lee. Therefore,
waiting until after the election to finalize the agreement
would be helpful. The Ambassador said waiting until after
the election would damage Korea’s credibility in the U.S.
Congress since there had already been delays. Lee replied
that if there were trust between the governments, one more
small delay due to real political concerns should not make
much difference. Rep. Chun disagreed with Lee and said she
thought it would be better to keep the current date and start
beef imports. Lee conceded that he originally wanted the
beef market to reopen as quickly as possible so people could
eat U.S. beef but had changed his mind recently because of
the potential loss in the by-election.
CONSERVATIVES BACK IN POWER
¶4. (C) Lee said the conservatives won the December
presidential and April National Assembly elections
convincingly, but some conservatives were disappointed by
President Lee’s focus on pragmatism at the expense of
traditional conservative principles. Due to disappointment
with Lee, many of the pro-U.S. conservatives, such as Park
Geun-hye and her supporters, were not interested in helping
Lee handle his latest crisis. Representative Chun added that
conservatives should thank President Lee for succeeding in
changing the government. She admitted, however, that Lee
Myung-bak’s over-emphasis on pragmatism was a mistake, and
the disappointment of some conservatives was regrettable but
understandable.
INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLES
¶5. (C) Because the April 9 National Assembly elections were
just 45 days after Lee Myung-bak’s February 25 inauguration,
the public intra-party struggle was inevitable, Lee lamented.
Compounding the issue, some Lee Myung-bak supporters had
tried to monopolize power by dominating the nomination
process. Lee said he had put a brake on this movement, which
led certain GNP lawmakers to sign a petition against his
nomination. These people have since apologized, Lee said.
Chun said some were opposed to Lee Sang-deuk remaining in the
National Assembly, but because Lee has an important role to
play, she had defended the choice to nominate Lee.
¶6. (C) Lee said that he was meeting traditional conservative
leaders on behalf of President Lee to try to smooth over
differences and convince them to support the President. Both
Chun and Lee were not optimistic, however, that the pro-Park
lawmakers could assimilate well into the GNP and support
President Lee, even if their party membership were
reinstated. Chun said that the likely scenario would result
in President Lee fighting not only the opposition party but
also the pro-Park lawmakers within the GNP. Chun said the
reason she was pessimistic was that the pro-Park lawmakers
had been critical of the ROKG regarding the beef agreement.
FANNING THE FLAMES OF DISCONTENT
¶7. (C) Before President Lee settled into office and “found
his place,” there was a struggle over nominations and
controversy surrounding beef, Lee said. Compounding these
problems, Lee appointed a group of rich, U.S.-educated Blue
House senior secretaries and did not understand why Korean
people would rally against such appointments. President Lee
kicked off his term without assessing the situation and
making concessions as needed. The reason for this, Lee said,
was that President Lee has “poor political instinct” since he
had not been directly involved in Korean politics for very
long. Worse still, many of President Lee’s close aides had
also never run for the National Assembly. Therefore, neither
President Lee nor his aides were able to imagine the problems
that arose.
ROK: PRO-U.S., PRO-JAPAN, NOT PRO-PRC
¶8. (C) Lee said that the lack of outrage over the Chinese
students who attacked some Koreans should not be a worry to
the U.S. since Lee Myung-bak was not pro-PRC. There is a
broad base built up over the decades fighting the
dictatorships in Korea and supporting pro-DPRK policies, Lee
said. USG leaders should realize that it will take time for
conservatives to unite and overcome this entrenched
organization.
¶9. (C) Chun pointed out that the ROK was closer to the U.S.
than to China due to recent history and this explained why
Koreans reacted more vehemently to the beef controversy than
to the violence by Chinese students. Chun pointed out that
conflicts between close friends or family members can be the
most severe. Also, the fact that Japan belonged to the visa
waiver program and the ROK did not contributed to sensitivity
on all issues American. Chun said her daughter recently
returned from study in the U.S. and wondered why there was a
debate over U.S. beef. More Koreans needed to have the
chance to go to the U.S. to dispel myths about the U.S. and
about U.S. beef, Chun concluded.
¶10. (C) The Ambassador said that President Lee was
respected, more in the U.S. than he was on April 18, when the
beef agreement was signed, because people now see how
difficult his decision was in light of the resultant domestic
opposition. The Ambassador assured Lee that the USG
appreciated President Lee’s firm support of the U.S. and that
the highest levels of the USG, especially President Bush,
were sensitive to the political situation in Korea and would
not press for controversial decisions while the situation
remained difficult. President Bush said during the summit
that no issue was a litmus test for the U.S.-ROK relationship
since the USG understood there were domestic concerns
influencing the handling of sensitive issues.
¶11. (C) Representative Lee said that President Lee Myung-bak
is pro-U.S. but there are still some pro-DPRK elements in the
press and in business. Therefore, the U.S. needs to help
President Lee until these elements are replaced naturally
over time. Some doubted President Lee, but Lee said he knew
Lee’s fundamental views were pro-U.S. and pro-Japan.
COMMENT
¶13. (C) Vice Speaker Lee is considered the most influential
lawmaker in the National Assembly due to his relationship
with President Lee and his status as the most senior
conservative legislator. The frustration with and criticism
of his brother, however, reflected an underlying tension
between the two. National Assembly sources note that
President Lee asked his elder brother not to run for National
Assembly and was hurt when Lee ignored his advice and ran for
a sixth term. This could have contributed to President Lee
ignoring the more politically astute Vice Speaker’s views on
matters of personnel and politics. A long-time proponent of
compromise, Lee has the authority and know-how to help his
brother address complaints about how he is running the
country. The big question is whether President Lee will
accept the help.
VERSHBOW
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생각해 보니까 제가 원글을 올린 이유를 말씀을 안드렸군요…
사실은 며칠전에 이곳에 어느분이 올린 posting에 달린 댓글 중에 이런게 있더라구요…
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???? 11-09-22 18:37 72.♡.246.34 답변 삭제
요글도 슬그머니 이상득 의원의 말을 바꾸어서 선동하고 있군요.
설마 이상득의원이 “”이명박 대통령은 뼛속까지 친미 친일이니 그의 시각에 대해선 의심할 필요가 없다” 라고 말햇을까..
……..
“이런식으로 우리 가카를 음해하는 글을 보고 그냥 지나치면 안될것 같아 진실을 알리고자 원글을 올렸습니다… 정치적의도가 아닌 진실규명 차원에서 올린 글이니 너무 흥분하시지 마시고요…
앞으로도 우리 가카에 대해 거짓과 음해를 일삼는 글이 올라오면 그때마다 제힘이 닿는데까지 진실을 밝히도록 노력하겠습니다…
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